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Benjamin Isakhan
READ ALL ABOUT IT: THE FREE PRESS, THE
PUBLIC SPHERE AND DEMOCRACY IN IRAQ
Despite a wealth of recent research which has detailed the impact that new
media outlets and technologies have had on the Middle East’s nascent public
sphere and its role in promoting democracy, there has been little investigation
into the re-emergence of the free press in Iraq following the toppling of Saddam
in 2003 and the corresponding end to his tight control over the nation’s media
sector by reviewing Iraq’s long relationship with the written word and its cor -
responding public sphere. It traces the introduction of the printing press to Iraq
by the Ottomans and details those periods when the Iraqi press was truly free,
fostering the emergence of a civil society and democratic reforms (such as under
the Young Turks, the early Hashemite era and following the Second World
War). It also examines those periods when the Iraqi media was most restricted
and did little else than praise the regime at hand (such as under Ottoman rule
and most recently under the Ba†th regime, especially under Saddam Hussein).
Following on, this article reviews the developments since the fall of Saddam
Hussein and, despite the extensive interference in Iraq’s media sector from gov -
ernmental entities both outside and inside Iraq, it concludes by arguing that
these papers have been central to the re-emergence of an Iraqi public sphere
which has openly debated and discussed the issues surrounding the nation’s
shift from despotism to democracy.
Introduction
IN HA B E R M A S I A N T E R M S, the public sphere can be defined as that which
“connects society with the state and thus has a function in the political
realm” (Habermas 1996, 28). Essentially, it is constituted by those social
institutions which engender a culture of open and rational debate
amongst the citizenry in order to form public opinion (Edgar 2006, 124).
Central to the formation of such a public sphere, or what we might oth-
erwise term a civil society, is the people’s autonomy, their access to infor-
mation and their willingness to engage in such debates (Rutherford 2004,
Bulletin of the Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies 8, nos. 1 & 2 (2006) : 00-00
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141-142). Habermas also noted that one of the vehicles for both provid-
ing information to the populace and propagating debate were the early
merchant newsletters of the sixteenth century (1989, 16) which “trans-
formed into instruments of political debate under the pressures of the
American and French revolutions and the organisation of political
groups to revolutionise society” (Kellner and Durham 2001, 10-11). With
the admission of journalists to the British House of Commons in 1803,
political journalism began (Edgar 2006, 125) and the media has since
been understood as crucial to the formation of a public sphere and civil
society, which in turn underpin the media’s role as the Fourth Estate of
a functioning democracy (Calhoun 1992; Dahlgren 1995). 
More recently, the role of Middle Eastern media in serving as the plat-
form of the region’s emerging public sphere and its role in promoting
democracy has become the centre of much scholarly investigation. Start-
ing with the Western radio stations beamed into the Middle East such as
the BBC, the Voice of America and Radio Monte Carlo, many Arabs
were able to quench their “thirst for objective information and diverse
analyses and viewpoints on the issues facing their societies” (Ghareeb
2000, 400). Similarly, the pan-Arab press, many of which have been pub-
lished in London for more than thirty years, continue to enjoy strong
readership across the region. Although at times they can be seen to sup-
port the interests and agendas of their owners (for example, many are
backed financially by the Saudi Government), when compared to the
tightly-controlled domestic media of most Arab nations they offer their
readers a refreshing voice of objectivity and critique (Ghareeb 2000, 412-
414; Rugh 2004, 167-180). Other technologies, such as the audiotape,
have proven effective in spreading messages of dissent. For example,
during the late 1970s in Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers
made effective use of this technology by recording sermons over the
phone from his exile in Paris and then distributing the contraband
audiotapes across the nation (Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi,
1994). More recent scholarship has illustrated the ways in which new
media technologies such as fax and photocopy machines, desktop pub-
lishing software, advertising, romance novels (see the contributions in
Eickelman and Anderson 2003b), recorded music, cinema, and ‘post-
modern’ literature (see the contributions in Armbrust 2000) have
allowed the people of the Arab world to evade and subvert the state-
controlled media and create an autonomous ‘public sphere’ by dissemi-
nating information through non-official organs. 
Today, the satellite dishes that are ubiquitous across the rooftops of
most of the Arab region have brought the world into the living rooms of
the Middle East. The general Middle Eastern dissatisfaction with Western
and government controlled satellite stations has led to Arab-based chan-
2 Benjamin Isakhan
03 Isakhan vol 8  9/4/08  1:44 PM  Page 2
READ ALL ABOUT IT
nels such as the Arab News Network, Abu Dhabi TV and, of course, Al-
Jazeera. Indeed, so popular are these satellite channels that they have
begun to have an impact on both the political elite of the region and their
state-funded media, “thus helping to broaden the limitations on debate
and to enhance the level of authentic democratic exchange” (Ghareeb
2000, 417; see also Ayish, 1970). The Al-Jazeera “phenomenon” (Miladi
2003) has received a superfluity of academic attention in recent years,
ranging from its adaptation of Western media techniques (Auter, Arafa,
and Al-Jaber 2005), questioning its status as ‘alternative media’ (Iskandar
2006) and detailing its challenge to the hegemony of the Western medias
monopoly on global news (Seib 2005). What is common throughout this
research is an understanding thatŒin the words of Qatari media scholar
Ali al-HailŒmedia outlets such as Al-Jazeera “are the best way to rein-
vigorate a sense of freedom, democratization, and liberty throughout the
Arab world, in addition to fostering a vibrant civil society” (al-Hail as
cited in El-Nawawy and Iskandar 2002, 28). Similarly, the issue of
whether ‘reality TV’ is the best hope for democratization in the Middle
East is the theme of a recent issue of ‘Translational Broadcasting Studies’
(especially Kraidy 2005). What is certain is that while Western media
scholars lament the ‘dumbing down’ of the media and an erosion of its
role in serving the ‘public interest’ and as the ‘watch-dog’ of democracy
due to commercial interests, these same commercial interests may, ironi-
cally, be bringing more news, information and debate into the Middle
East (Sreberny-Mohammadi 1998, 195). 
Likewise the internet and its impacts on the Middle East have been
investigated by a surfeit of academics from a number of different disci-
plines. Like much of the developing world, the vast majority of the Mid-
dle East sadly lies on the wrong side of the ‘Digital Divide’: the
technological infrastructure is limited, few can afford a computer let
alone regular access to the internet, few are able to read the now global
language of English, and in many countries the government continues to
tightly monitor access to certain sites (Friedlander 2000, 152-155; Ghareeb
2000, 415). However, with the development of software that has enabled
standard computers to produce Arabic script (Gonzalez-Quijano 2003,
62), the internet has begun to serve as a forum whereby pertinent issues
facing the Arab worldŒsuch as questions of religion (J. W. Anderson
2003) and women’s role in society (Skalli 2006)Œcan be re-examined and
re-defined. Others have used the internet to critique their respective
nation state or, at the very least as a locus for debate surrounding domes-
tic issues of public concern and calls for democratization (Cunningham
2002; Teitelbaum 2002; Wheeler 2001). The net effect of these online
developments has altered “the nature of the decision-making process in
each country, weakening hierarchical systems, reducing the power of the
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state, and redistributing power downward” (Ghareeb 2000, 398). 
Collectively, this spectrum of media outlets and technologiesŒfrom
the pan-Arab press to the internet, and from the audiotape to reality
TVŒhas had tremendous impact on the societies of the Middle East.
Firstly, as Ghareeb points out, they have led to a cross-border, pan-Arab
discourse where citizens, from Marrakech to Muscat, are imbued with a
sense of collective cultural unity and the notion of a common Arab
agenda (2000, 416-418). This, combined with the exposure to the rest of
the world has led to a more informed, and arguably more critical, Mid-
dle Easterner who is interested in partaking in the machinations of egal-
itarian governance. Although it is clear that many governments across
the region are continuing their battle to keep the media on a tight leash,
if the current technological and social trends continue, the media is
likely to increase in diversity and openness, thereby spurring “greater
debate in Middle East societies, with further pressures for both cultural
and political democratisation” (Sreberny-Mohammadi 1998, 197).
However, despite this wealth of research, there has been little investi-
gation into the re-emergence of the free press in Iraq following the top-
pling of Saddam in 2003 and the corresponding end to his tight control
over the nation’s media sector. This has seen Iraq shift from only a hand-
ful of state papers that served as propaganda machines, to a wealth of
over 200 Iraqi-owned newspapers which are being fervently produced
and avidly read on the streets of the nation. This article therefore begins
by reviewing Iraq’s long relationship with the written word and its cor-
responding public sphere. It traces the introduction of the printing press
to Iraq by the Ottomans and details those periods where Iraq’s press was
truly free, fostering the emergence of a civil society and democratic
reforms (such as under the Young Turks, the early Hashemite era of
1921-1938, and following the Second World War). It also examines those
periods where the Iraqi media was most restricted and did little else
than praise the regime at hand (such as the early Ottoman period and
most recently under the Ba†th Regime, especially under Saddam Hus-
sein). Following on, this article reviews the developments since the fall
of Saddam Hussein and, despite the extensive interference in Iraq’s
media sector from the governmental entities both outside and inside
Iraq, it concludes by arguing that these papers have been central to the
re-emergence of an Iraqi public sphere which has openly debated and
discussed the issues surrounding the nation’s shift from despotism to
democracy.
From cuneiform to propaganda: Iraq’s long relationship
with the written word
It is only in relatively recent times that we have come to understand the
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historic importance and influence of the region known as Mesopotamia
in the Ancient World, currently known as Iraq. In fact, it was the early
city-states that developed across this ‘cradle of civilization’ around 3200
BC which fostered the development of early farming practices, includ-
ing sophisticated irrigation and animal domestication, monumental arts
and architecture, mass-produced goods such as pottery, and a complex,
urbane and cosmopolitan society (Frankfort 1968, 49; Seymour 2004, 351;
Van de Mieroop 1997, 36). The need to organize and administer the com-
plexities of such large agricultural projects and a sophisticated temple
and city economy prompted the development of the world’s first writ-
ten language (Frankfort 1968, 49-50; Jacobsen 1977a, 129; Van de
Mieroop 1997, 36). This involved using a split reed to create the distinc-
tive wedge-shaped marks known as cuneiform on clay tablets (Greaves,
Zaller, Cannistrano and Murphey 1997, 18) which evolved from early
markings concerning systems of weight and measurement through to a
rich body of literary texts (for translations of a number of early
cuneiform texts, see Pritchard 1968). 
In addition, the major excavations of the twentieth century across the
Middle East also revealed much about the political machinations
employed in the ancient Near East. Of foremost relevance here is the
governance of Mesopotamia’s early city-states by a political system that
Jacobsen has termed ‘Primitive Democracy’ (1970) where “ultimate
political power rested with a general assembly of all adult freemen”
(Jacobsen 1977b, 128) (for more on ‘Primitive Democracy,’ see Isakhan
2006b). This system of governance encouraged all citizens of the stateŒ
men and women (Saggs 2004, 30)Œto exercise their right to express their
opinion in a public forum regarding affairs that threatened the security
of the state as a whole. In this situation, discussion continued until a vir-
tual unanimity was reached and consensus emerged over the appropri-
ate action (Jacobsen 1970, 138; Oppenheim 1964, 114). Beyond the
deliberations of the assembly was a civic culture that extended into the
day-to-day lives of the ancient Mesopotamian where citizens further dis-
cussed and debated social issues, often forming loose political alliances
(Larsen 1976, 161-170). 
However, examples of the centrality of the written word to the Mid-
dle East’s civic culture are not limited to the annals of ancient history. In
fact, the written word was critical to the expansion of Islam and went on
to play a central role in the bureaucracy and thriving literary scene of
both the Umayyad (661-750) and Abbasid (750-1258) Caliphates (Rosen-
thal 1975). Under the †Abbasids for example, the capital of the empire
shifted from Damascus to Baghdad (Gutas 1998, 17), where reading and
writing underpinned the establishment of an active religious public
sphere of “learned scholars, schools of jurisprudence, and their support-
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ers” who were “often autonomous from the official sphere of [their]
rulers” (Eickelman and Anderson 2003a, 2). Emerging out of this ninth
century public sphere was the work of an enormously popular social
commentator and essayist by the name of al-Jahiz. After moving north
from Basra, al-Jahiz spent much of his time embroiled in the lively civic
culture that played out in the various bourgeois salons of Baghdad,
where lengthy debate and lively conversation thrived as the people
engaged with issues such as politics, social controversies, the conflict
between faith and reason as well as sectarian and ethnic tensions
(Braude 2003, 114). However, it was his unique ability to comment on
and contribute to these debates in his elaborate and scholarly essays that
ultimately won al-Jahiz wide acclaim.
This lively civic culture can be seen to have continued right through
to the Ottoman sultans who generally believed that a strong, civilized
state was a cosmopolitan one (Mostyn and Hourani 1988, 192). In fact, it
was the Ottomans who first brought the wonders of press technology to
Baghdad in the nineteenth century. There is some anecdotal evidence to
suggest that a local news bulletin, The Journal of Iraq, existed in Baghdad
as early as 1816 and was published in both Arabic and Turkish. It is
thought that this paper mostly praised the local Ottoman governor (the
paper’s publisher), and was distributed to his army officials and other
dignitaries. Although there are no surviving copies of The Journal of Iraq,
if the reports are true it would have been the first time that news was
reported in Arabic anywhere in the world (Ayalon 1995, 13). What is cer-
tain is that the Turkish press had been growing since as early as the
appearance of Takvim-I Vekayi (the Turkish version of the French news-
paper Le Spectateur Oriental) in 1831 (Lewis 1961, 93, 143-147) and when
a progressive Ottoman Vali (governor) by the name of Midhat Pasha
took the post in Baghdad in 1869, he brought with him the latest tech-
nology in the form of the printing press along with the zeal for modern-
ization, both of which he had acquired during his previous post in Paris.
Among his many achievements was the founding of the weekly news-
paper, Al-Zawra (“the Curved [city]”ŒBaghdad), a four-paged Arabic-
Turkish paper that preferred to extol the virtues of the sultan and the
efficiency of the government than to report ‘real’ news (Ayalon 1995, 25).
In the 1880s the Valis of both Mosul and Basra followed Midhat Pasha’s
example, launching similar pro-Ottoman papers which have been noted
for their primitive news-collecting methods and their poor Arabic trans-
lations (Ayalon 1995, 25-26).
The arrival of technologies such as the printing pressŒas well as
other developments born out of the Industrial Revolution, including
river steam navigation and the electric telegraphŒheralded a funda-
mental shift in Iraq’s political sphere. Over time these technological
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developments led to a steady erosion of various elements of traditional
Iraq, including the break up of many of the old loyalties and allegiances
of the tribal order as well as the decline of the traditional economic struc-
tures of farming and other trades and the subsequent, if gradual, urban-
ization of the Iraqi population. These changes to the political, economic
and social stratification of traditional Iraq witnessed the development of
an urbane, middle-class intelligentsia who, in turn, provided the breed-
ing ground for the myriad of Iraqi opposition parties and revolutionary
movements (such as the Communists, the Ba†thists and the National
Party) that would go on to have enormous impact on the political land-
scape of twentieth century Iraq (Batatu 1982, 22-24, 1113-1114). How-
ever, despite the development of an élite public sphere, Iraq did not see
the immediate birth of a free and critical press during the late nineteenth
century. Apart from two literary-religious journals published by the
Carmelites in Baghdad and the Dominican missionaries of Mosul, any
other attempts at establishing an independent press were “strictly and
narrowly circumscribed by suspicious authorities” (Ayalon 1995, 62).
This is not true of the entire region, as significant and critical journalis-
tic movements arose in both Lebanon and Egypt at this time. However,
when the Young Turks were able to successfully challenge the empire
(Lewis 1994, 52), they set about establishing a constitutional government
and restoring measures of autonomy to the various national-cultural
entities within their governance (Shmuelevitz 2004, 28). They also went
on to establish secular schools and liberalized the publications sector
(Zubaida 2002, 209), effectively ushering in a series of rapid develop-
ments in the free press of the Middle East. By Iraq’s first parliamentary
election in 1908, there were, “no less than 44 new Arabic papers . . . in
Lebanon, Syria, Palestine and Iraq, as well as in Istanbul” (Ayalon 1995,
65). In subsequent years, press freedom was prevalent across Iraq, with
the publication of not only papers in support of the ruling party in Istan-
bul, such as Al-Zawra, but also opposition papers including Bayn al-
Nahrayn (“Mesopotamia,” or more literally, “Between the Two Rivers”)
(Ayalon 1995, 66). In addition, Iraqis also had access to newspapers from
Syria and Lebanon (Braude 2003, 144) as well as those from Istanbul,
including anti-Young Turk papers like Volkan (“Volcano”) (Lewis 1994,
110) and Zionist papers published by the Jewish community such as the
weekly Hamevasser (“Herald”) (Shmuelevitz 2004). Many of these news-
papers and magazines of the Young Turk period were filled with long
editorials praising the new era of tolerance and press freedom (Ayalon
1995, 65-66). Collectively, they have been described by one author as
combining
a large measure of freedom with a high level of scholarship, contain[ing]
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what are probably the best-informed and best-argued discussions that
have yet occurred between conservatives and modernists and between
the different groups within each camp (Lewis 1994, 111).
This brought with it a strong augmentation of Iraq’s culture of public
debate and criticism as is best evidenced by the atmosphere surround-
ing Iraq’s 1912 election, where “Iraqis witnessed for the first time [the
phenomenon] of party competition among the candidates” (Al-Wardi as
cited in Dawisha 2005, 12). During this period, even those too poor to
afford newspapers would line up at street-side newsvendors to rent a
paper or share with others. In total, this period led to the founding of 355
newspaper and journals across the Ottoman Empire, including seventy
independent newspapers in Iraq alone (Ayalon 1995, 65). However, this
period was relatively short-lived and plagued by newspapers which
were published sporadically, shifted location and focus often, and var-
ied immensely in their quality. Furthermore, with the outbreak of the
First World War, the Ottomans began to impose strict censorship on all
print media throughout the empire. Save for two sporadic and privately-
owned papers (one in Baghdad, the other in Mosul), this ultimately led
to the closure of every newspaper in Iraq (Ayalon 1995, 67, 70-71). 
Modern IraqŒthe nation that we know todayŒresulted from the fall
of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War. In the clan-
destine Sykes-Picot agreement, Britain and France moved into much of
what are now Iraq, Syria, Jordan and Israel, and carved up the region
into two zones of influence (L. Anderson and Stansfield 2004, 14; Dia-
mond 2005, 31; Keeble 1997, 86). The era of British occupationŒwhich
began with their control of Basra from the start of the war and spread to
the entire nation of Iraq by the end of 1918Œalso brought with it an
unprecedented sense of Iraqi nationalism. The presence of a common
enemy meant that groups such as the Shi†ites and the Sunn•s banded
together for the first time in centuries, holding joint religio-political
meetings which culminated “in patriotic oratory and poetic thundering
against the English” (Batatu 1982, 23). Later, when the League of Nations
accorded the British a mandate over Iraq in 1920-1921 (L. Anderson and
Stansfield 2004, 14), these sentiments were echoed in the dramatic
upsurge of budding wordsmiths who produced independent papers
such as Al-Istiql§l (“The Independence” of Najaf), Al-Fur§t (“The
Euphrates”) and Al-Istiql§l (“The Independence” of Baghdad), which
openly criticized the occupation. Following this initial uproar, a number
of papersŒsome the unapologetic mouthpiece for a particular political
faction, others claiming to be independentŒemerged for the sole pur-
pose of addressing Iraq’s future and discussing the pros and cons of a
republican vs. a monarchical government (Ayalon 1995, 92).
8 Benjamin Isakhan
03 Isakhan vol 8  9/4/08  1:44 PM  Page 8
READ ALL ABOUT IT
Without too much concern for the opinions and attitudes expressed in
these organs, the British hastily set about designing the nation-states of
the modern Middle East. In 1921, the British united the three previously
autonomous Vilayets (“regions”) of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul (Cordes-
man and Hashim 1997, 59-60, 71) and appointed Faisal IŒthe third son
of the Sharif of MeccaŒthe first modern king of Iraq (L. Anderson and
Stansfield 2004, 14; Zubaida 2002, 211). After having appointed Faisal,
the British staged the first of modern Iraq’s falsified experiments with
democracy, a national referendum which garnered an impossible 96 per-
cent endorsement of his rule (L. Anderson and Stansfield 2004, 14-15).
The local authorities of the various provinces were infuriated, and cler-
ics who had so adamantly called on Faisal to implement a parliament
and a national constitution now delivered fatwas banning their religious
minions from partaking in the elections for the Constituent Assembly
until such a time as the monarch yielded to the people’s call for democ-
ratization, civil liberties and freedom of the press (Dawisha 2005, 13).
Heeding these calls, Faisal did go on to establish a number of quasi-
democratic reforms, including nation-building exercises such as the
development of highly patriotic national school curricula (Batatu 1982,
25), a new constitution, an electoral law (L. Anderson and Stansfield
2004, 16-18), and a Parliament consisting of both a Majlis al-Nuww§b
(“Chamber of Deputies”) and a Majlis al-A†y§n (“Senate”) in 1924 which
lasted until 1958 (Dawisha 2005, 18). 
Those who did ascend to positions of power under the new monarchy
failed to garner any real public support, and seem to have been perpet-
ually concerned with those who sought to undermine them (Kedourie
1994, 33). Indeed, this dissatisfaction with authority in Iraq led to the
emergence of several opposition parties during these early days of polit-
ical struggle in the fledgling nation. These opposition parties quickly set
up their own newspapers which were instrumental in mobilizing more
than ten thousand people as they demonstrated in front of the King’s
palace on the first anniversary of his ascension to the throne, demanding
a representational government and an end to British interference in
domestic issues. By the late 1920s, Iraq saw the emergence of a varied, if
partisan, press which included Al-†fllam al-†Arab• (“The Arabic World”),
Al-Liw§¥ (“The Standard”) and Al-Taqaddum (“The Priority”), all of
which supported the Progressive Party (Hizb al-Taqaddum); ‹ad§ al-†Ahd
(“The New Echo”) published by the Commitment Party (⁄izb al-†Ahd);
Al-†Ir§q (“The Iraq”) from the oppositional People’s Party (⁄izb al-Sha†b);
and the highly esteemed Al-Bil§d (“The Country”) newspaper, pub-
lished by Christians in Baghdad who were members of the Nationalist
Fraternity Party (⁄izb al-Ikh§¥ al-Wa™an•) (for further details on the news-
papers published by these various political parties see Ayalon 1995, 93-
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94; for an exhaustive chronicle on Iraq’s political groups and their
respective histories, see Batatu 1982; and for specific information on this
era in Iraqi politics, see Dawisha 2005, 14-15).
What is clear here is that Iraqi politics of the 1920s was a complex
matrix constituted by a myriad of tribal, political, religious and ethnic
factions, each of which vied for influence and authority under the newly
established monarchy. Although there is evidence of an egalitarian and
democratic culture emerging during this period, it is dangerous to
assume that this was always the case. Indeed, Iraq’s political climate of
this era was often violent, with one commentator describing it as “a
wretched political architecture and constitutional jerry-building of the
flimsiest and most dangerous kind” (Kedourie 1970, 239). Nonetheless,
this era also witnessed an unprecedented diversity in Iraq’s print sector,
with the establishment of sixty-one papers between 1919 and 1933 (Daw-
isha 2005, 21). Sadly, many of these papers, like the political parties to
which they belonged, folded within a couple of years. However, despite
their short lifespan, these highly partisan papers were able to invigorate
the Iraqi ‘public sphere,’ enabling ‘rational-critical’ debate in both the
parliament and the streets of the nation. 
With the signing of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty in 1930, Iraq finally
emerged as an independent nation, although the British presence con-
tinued for some years. Sadly, the democratic and egalitarian steps taken
during the 1920s were reneged and, in the 1930s,
Iraqi politics were based on personal, family, and tribal loyalties. Hastily
created political parties that disbanded just as quickly, and even parlia-
ment itself, were forums of secondary consequence, for it was clan
alliances that were of primary importance, whether forged in or out of
parliament or the parties . . . Old-style plotting involving local Shi†ite
religious leaders, tribal chiefs, and the military proved infinitely more
effective than the modern modes of political activity, including elections
and the press (Ayalon 1995, 93).
This situation paved the way for a series of political coups between 1936
and 1941, most of which were violent and few cared for installing any
semblance of legitimate democratic rule. Concurrently, this period in
Iraq was also marred by a poor press. There were increases in censorship
of those organs which openly criticized the government, while the gen-
eral standard of reporting and the technical standard of the papers was
particularly low, the literacy rate was also below average for the region,
and the circulation of many papers was down (Ayalon 1995, 94-95).
Despite this, there were several newspapers which emerged during the
1930s that warrant a mention, ‹ad§ al-Istiql§l (“Echo of Independence”),
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and Al-Ah§l• (“The People”), both published by the Iraqi Nationalist
Party (Jam§†at al-Ah§l•), ⁄abazb¶z (a term from Iraqi folklore), a Baghdad
paper filled with political satire (Daragahi 2003, 50) and perhaps Iraq’s
most successful, professional and well-respected paper of this era, Azza -
man (“Time”), published by an Iraqi Christian. 
Although the Second World War did see actual, if limited, fighting in
Iraq, this war did not have anywhere near the impact on the Arab Mid-
dle East as the First World War. When the fighting began, the govern-
ment of Iraq placed the newspapers and magazines of the nation under
tight censorship laws in an attempt to curtail anti-British sentiment
(Dawisha 2005, 22). This, coupled with the severe economic conditions
throughout the war, had implications for Iraqi civil society and its free
press, with many of the smaller papers across the region folding accord-
ingly. However, with the cessation of the war, the Regent of Iraq, Prince
†Abd al-Ilah announced a return to the political life of the 1920s and the
lifting of the restrictions on the freedom of the press (Dawisha 2005, 15).
This brought with it an immediate upsurge in both the number and vari-
ety of political parties in Iraq, from pro-government, pro-British parties,
to centrist, right- and left-leaning parties, and even two Marxist parties
(Dawisha 2005, 15-16). Once again, many of these parties spawned their
own publications. The Independence Party’s (⁄izb al-Istiql§l) produced
“The Independent Standard” (Liw§¥ al-Istiql§l), while The National
Democratic Party (Al-⁄izb al-Wa™an• al-D•muqr§™•) published “The Voice
of the People” (‹awt al-Ah§l•Œa reincarnation of Al-Ah§l• after it had
been banned from publishing under its original name) (Dawisha 2005,
15-16, 22-23). It appears that, on the whole, the newspapers were rela-
tively free to express diverse opinions, particularly when compared to
the press in those regions still controlled by the British and the French. 
One commentator goes on to compare the Arab press of this era to
that of the press which followed the American Revolution, in so far as it
was dominated by “the numerous, tiny enterprise, highly partisan,
political party press” (McFadden 1953, 36-37). Despite the fact that as
late as 1947, only eleven percent of Iraqis over the age of five were liter-
ate (Ayalon 1995, 95), McFadden was optimistic regarding not only the
gradual increase in journalistic standards of the Middle Eastern press,
but its role in future political developments. To a large extent this opti-
mism was justified given the happenings of the years that immediately
followed. In 1948, when the Iraqi government was about to sign a revi-
sion to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 (which appeared to bring Iraq fur-
ther into line with British interests in the nation), the Iraqi opposition
were virulent in their dissent, using their newspapers to encourage mas-
sive demonstrations on the streets of Baghdad. Sadly, however, the
power of the press proved too much for the ruling elite, and they there-
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fore implemented a ban on a “number of these papers, and to increase
the censorship on what they were able to write” (Dawisha 2005, 22). 
The tide turned somewhat with the introduction of new media tech-
nologies to the region throughout the 1950s. Indeed, radio, television
and further developments in the print media seemed to bring with them
unprecedented media pervasiveness in the Middle East, if not always
media freedoms. In Iraq, the nation’s first television station went to air
in 1956 (the same year as Sweden, see Daragahi 2003, 47), ushering in a
new interest in the media, if only for the novel pleasures that such a
visual medium could provide. 
In 1958, Abdul Karim QasimŒa senior military officer and friend to
many Iraqi opposition groupsŒcoordinated the bloody coup d’état
which disposed of the monarchy, and he became Iraq’s prime minister.
Despite the fact that Iraq at this time had an illiteracy rate of approxi-
mately 85 percent (Batatu 1982, 34), under Qasim’s authority the heavily
partisan newspapers of Iraq continued to enjoy considerable autonomy
and popularity. However, Qasim did offer particular support to the ris-
ing ranks of the Communist Party (Batatu 1982, 35) and, by 1962, there
were twenty newspapers in Baghdad, approximately one-third of which
had pro-Communist tendencies (Rugh 2004, 46-47). 
Qasim’s leadership was short-lived, however, as three brothers, the
nephews of the deposed King Faisal, coordinated another coup d’état
which saw the establishment of the Arif regime. Each of the Arif broth-
ers served as Iraq’s leader in quick succession between 1963 and 1968,
and the firstŒColonel Abdul Salam ArifŒis credited with beginning the
Arab Socialist Union (for more on the Arif regime, see Batatu 1982, 1027-
1072). Ironically, it was elements of this party which were to go on and
form the Arab Ba†th Socialist Party (ABSP) and usurp the Arif brothers’
reign. In addition, the Arif period also saw the passing of Press Law No.
53, which enabled heavy censorship of the press and tight control of
media licenses (Rugh 2004, 50). Despite the authoritarian leadership of
the Arif regime, Iraqis were still surprisingly politically active through-
out this period. Once again, the political, religious, ethnic and tribal lines
that maladroitly divided the nation were overtly political, with each
group striving to ascend the hierarchy and establish themselves at the
fulcrum of state authority in Baghdad. Even so, there were some minor
developments in the media sector, including the launch of an Iraqi Eng-
lish-language paper to serve the growing expatriate community, The
Baghdad Observer (Hurrat and Leidig 1994, 98-99).
The media under the Arab Ba†th Socialist Party and the rule of 
Saddam Hussein
Unfortunately, the political climate fostered under the Arif Regime did
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little to encourage the establishment of moderate and legitimate political
movements, and arguably paved the way for the violent military coup
d’état in which the Arab Ba†th Socialist Party (ABSP) claimed authority
in 1968 (Daragahi 2003, 46; Seymour 2004, 355). During this time there
was a brief struggle for power between the two allies in the coup, the
military and the Ba†th, with each of these bodies controlling one of the
two major newspapers in Iraq at that time, Al-Thawra (“The Revolu-
tion”) and Al-Jumh¶riyya (“The Republic”), respectively (Bengio 2004,
110). This struggle for power was promptly decided in favour of the
Ba†th, and served as a valuable lesson for the party regarding the power
of the press. 
They acted quickly. One of the Ba†th Party’s first acts was to jail, charge
and then execute Abdul Aziz Barakat, who was both the head of the Jour-
nalist’s Union and the publisher of A l - M a n § r (“The Beacon” or “The
Lighthouse”Œnot to be confused with today’s Hezbollah-controlled tele-
vision station of the same name), one of the most professionally-run and
widely-distributed dailies in Iraq at the time (Daragahi 2003, 46, 50). Fol-
lowing this, in 1969 the Ba†th Party established a publications law which
effectively made the media the fourth branch of the newly established
government (Braude 2003, 146). This saw the Iraqi media industry
quickly transform into one that was “more controlled, monolithic,
mobilised and almost completely stripped of any critical approach” (Ben-
gio 2004, 110). By 1974-75 this meant that although Iraq had a literacy rate
of 30 percent (Rugh 1979, 3), it had only five daily newspapers, each of
which was heavily influenced, if not completely controlled by, the state.
These papers were A l - J u m h ¶ r i y y a, A l - T h a w r a, The Baghdad Observer, the
state-sanctioned paper of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, A l - T a ¥ § k h •
(“The Brotherhood”) and the Communist party organ, ¤ar•q al-Sha†b
(“The Path of the People”) (Rugh 1979, 32).
However, if the lack of an egalitarian political culture and a free press
had been evident since the Ba†th ascension to power, it was to further
deteriorate following the “self-election” of the late Saddam Hussein to
the presidency of Iraq in 1979. It is now well known that Saddam’s rise
to power “was marked by terror, coercion and purges of Ba†th party
members” (Seymour 2004, 355), that he went on to commit grievous
crimes against his own citizens, especially the many religious and ethnic
minorities of Iraq (Cordesman and Hashim 1997, 111-118), and that he
was one of the cruellest and most tyrannical despots of modern times.
What is perhaps less well known is that Saddam was also a powerful
and charismatic politician, a master of a rhetoric that appealed directly
to the “everyday Iraqi” and an expert at image management (for more
on this, see Bengio, 1998). Indeed, having witnessed firsthand the role of
the media during the ascension of the Ba†th Party to power a little over
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a decade earlier, Saddam was all too aware of the power of the press and
quickly set about modelling them after other twentieth century totalitar-
ian examples, such as Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Although
the nation retained its five daily newspapers under Saddam’s rule, he
was quick to quash any lingering notions of freedom of the press by
making sure that the entire media industry was folded under the author-
ity of the government (Hurrat and Leidig 1994, 107). This meant that
each of Iraq’s papers soon became state-run propaganda instruments,
dutifully reciting official policy and praising governmental action (Daw-
isha 2004, 14). He ensured that this occurred through rigorous and clan-
destine monitoring of the media, as well as more banal and overt
practices such as insisting that his photograph be featured daily on the
front page and that each of his speeches was printed in full (Braude 2003,
139-140). Saddam was also careful to minimize exposure to outside
media by periodically jamming news broadcasts from outside of Iraq
(Cordesman and Hashim 1997, 120) and imposing a five-year prison sen-
tence for owning a satellite dish (Braude 2003, 150).
During the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88, Saddam made further inroads in
limiting press freedom across Iraq. In 1986 he passed both Press Act 206
and Decree Number 804. The first of these prohibited Iraqi journalists
from writing articles on twelve specific subjects, including any criticism
of the President and his policies (Cordesman and Hashim 1997, 120),
while the second made such criticisms punishable by death (Daragahi
2003, 46). It appears that Saddam made concerted efforts to point out the
tremendous role that the media played during times of war. Indeed, he
appears to have seen the media as an essential part of Iraq’s military
machine, dubbing them the ‘information corps’ (Bengio 2004, 110).
Immediately after the war, however, Saddam was faced with thousands
of men returning from the frontline to an Iraq that had no employment
opportunities awaiting them. Many of these citizensŒparticularly the
already disenfranchised Shi†ites and Kurds living in a Sunni controlled
stateŒbegan to revolt against Saddam’s authority and called for demo-
cratic reforms (Keeble 1997, 12). Surprisingly, Saddam endorsed this
movement, seemingly because he believed that some form of public
debate over democracy would enable his citizens to voice their griev-
ances without subverting his authority. In line with other authoritarian
leaders (Dahl 1998, 10) Saddam set about labelling himself “the engineer
of democracy” or “the shepherd of democracy,” although he failed to
clearly detail what his actual approach to democracy was and how this
would be implemented (Bengio 1998, 60-62). This had a parallel impact
on the journalistic profession where those tired of toeing the official
party line beganŒalbeit subtlyŒto call for democratic reform and to
challenge and criticize various aspects of public life under Saddam (Ben-
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gio 2004, 117-118).
However, with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 and the
subsequent Gulf War, these meagre efforts at democratizing Iraq’s
media were quashed. Although much has been written about the West-
ern coverage of this warŒparticularly its status as a “clean” war of spec-
tacle, propaganda and illusion, little is known about the Iraqi press of
this period. It can be assumed, however, that Saddam continued to
maintain a tight control over his ‘information corps,’ using it to promote
his actions and damn those of his enemies. What is known for sure is
that immediately following the Gulf War, Iraq was placed under heavy
sanctions from the international community (Herring 2004; Simons
1998) as well as internal pressure to democratize. This led Saddam to
conduct mock elections in the hope of placating a public that had now
endured twenty-three years of Ba†th rule and two wars. Firstly, Sad-
dam’s eldest son, Uday Hussein was “unanimously elected” to the posi-
tion of the Head of the Journalist’s Union in 1992, leaving him in charge
of several newspapers, a radio station and responsible for the censorship
and management of the rest of the nation’s media (Daragahi 2003, 47).
Specifically, there were six official daily newspapers which all came
under the jurisdiction of the newly appointed Uday. There was Al-
Thawra, Al-Jumh¶riyya and The Baghdad Observer, all of which had sur-
vived since the early days of the Ba†th regime. In addition, Iraq’s media
landscape also contained Al-†Ir§q, the official state-run Kurdish newspa-
per, Uday Hussein’s own personal paper B§bil (established in 1990, it
occasionally featured opinion editorials critical of “incompetent” gov-
ernment officials) and Al-Q§disiyya (a military paper which hit the news-
stands during the Iran-Iraq War and was shrewdly named after a battle
in 637 AD in which the Arabs defeated the Persians) (Hurrat and Leidig
1994, 98-99).
The result of having his son in such a prestigious position was that
Saddam could continue to manipulate the media at will. Indeed, one of
the continuing traits of the Ba†thist press was its role in tarnishing the
image of an ongoing succession of ‘others’. At times, this meant turning
the media against factions of the citizenry, especially the Kurds or the
Shi†ites, or against regional enemies such as Iran and Kuwait, global
superpowers such as the United States or the West in general, and,
almost without interruption, against Israel (Bengio 2004, 111-112).
Uday’s appointment also allowed Saddam to reward sycophantic jour-
nalists who were prepared to sacrifice their journalistic integrity for a
career that rapidly ascended the Ba†thist ladder. Although Saddam
received much criticism in the expatriate Iraqi press after he was unsur-
prisingly “re-elected” as President of Iraq in the 1992 sham election
(Rugh 2004, 64), the domestic press was understandably much more
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supportive, with one commentator even receiving $2,500 and a Honda
after having called for Saddam’s continuation in office (Daragahi 2003,
47). Other examples of upwardly mobile journalists who toed the
Ba†thist line include a Chaldean Christian by the name of Tariq Aziz,
who began his political career as the editor of Al-Thawra, later received
the post of Iraq’s Foreign Minister during the 1991 Gulf War, and then
served as Deputy Prime Minister until Saddam’s overthrow in 2003 (for
details on this and other examples, see Braude 2003, 146-147; and Rugh
2004, 8). 
However, if the rewards were high for those whose journalism
adhered tightly to Ba†thist doctrine and the leadership of Saddam, the
punishment for those who did not was extreme. In 1991, a political com-
mentator by the name of Aziz al-Sayed Jassem was arrested and later
disappeared after refusing to write books that praised the President’s
leadership, while a prominent Al-Thawra journalist disappeared after
criticizing articles in his own paper (Daragahi 2003, 46). In 1999, Uday
went as far as personally firing one thousand writers for not praising the
President with the required enthusiasm. In total, over 500 journalists,
writers and intellectuals went missing or were executed during the rule
of the Ba†th Party according to one French Human Rights organization,
the International Alliance for Justice (as cited in Daragahi 2003, 46). In
fact, Uday is said to have set up special prisons expressly designed for
torturing and detaining Iraq’s journalists and political dissidents (see for
example the story of an Iraqi journalist by the name of Yunis, as retold
in Epperlein and Tucker 2006). Even those journalists who attempted to
bring humour to the autocracy of Saddam faced heavy penalties, with
one writer arrested and then tortured for having written that Saddam
cared about every last detail in Iraq, even the toilets (Whitaker 2003). On
top of this, media audiences were also targeted, particularly in the
autonomous Kurdish north where, despite the fact that it had developed
something of a free press since its establishment in 1991, one man was
reportedly sentenced to twenty-one years imprisonment after being
found with a copy of a non-state Kurdish paper by the name of Al-Itti¡§d
(“Unity”) (Daragahi 2003, 46-48).
With such extreme punishment handed out to the journalists who
were even remotely critical of the central authority in Baghdad, it is lit-
tle wonder that Bengio describes the Iraqi media of this era as “an
omnipotent propaganda machine” which “played the role of the Ba†th
regime’s watchdog, thus contributing significantly to its survival and
longevity” (2004, 109-110). However, the state’s abolishment of freedom
of the press did not completely destroy the journalistic movement in
Iraq. Many of those who desired to criticise Saddam and the Ba†th Party
left the country and joined the growing ranks of the expatriate opposi-
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tion press, while those who stayed were free to channel their talents and
creativity into the means of conveying the official news to the populace
(Braude 2003, 146). Others went even further. Journalism educators at
Baghdad’s College of Mass Media (which taught courses in print, photo,
radio and TV journalism, and was the only school of journalism in the
country, see Hurrat and Leidig 1994, 97) were renowned for teaching
their students the fundamentals of good reporting accuracy, objectivity
and the quest for truth. Journalists at Nab∞ al-Shab§b (“the Pulse of
Youth”), the weekly Uday-controlled newspaper of the Youth Union,
was able to candidly criticize the government and its strict control of the
people, the actions of Tariq Aziz (the Deputy Prime Minister) and pro-
mote opposition figures such as Ahmad Chalabi before Saddam cracked
down and the newspaper’s staff were pushed out (Daragahi 2003, 47-
48).
However, not even Saddam Hussein could have predicted the cata-
clysmic attacks on the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New
York and the Pentagon in Washington on September 11, 2001. These
events ushered in a seismic shift in global politics, perhaps best illus-
trated by US President George W. Bush’s declaration of a “War on Ter-
ror” which started first in Afghanistan and then moved to Iraq. Despite
the wealth of scholarship on both the Afghanistan and Iraq wars and
their coverage in the Western media, there appears to be very little
research that details the coverage which appeared in the Iraqi press from
September 11, 2001 to the fall of Baghdad in 2003. We do know that in
2002 Saddam conducted another of Iraq’s sham elections, this time win-
ning 100 percent of the vote (Rugh 2004, 34). It is also fairly safe to
assume that, up until at least the beginning of the war, the official Iraqi
press continued in its unwavering support for Saddam and its critique
of those who might threaten his authority (there is no doubt that Presi-
dent Bush came under heavy fire for his stance against the “Axis of Evil”
and his “War on Terror,” while the “Coalition of the Willing” would
have been criticized for their involvement). What we do know for sure
is that the Iraqi Minister of Information, Mohammad Sa†id al-Sahhaf,
continued to broadcast his versions of events throughout the war (Mir-
zoeff 2005, 77). Although he lost much of his credibility over the insis-
tence that the Coalition troops were meeting fierce resistance (which
incidentally made him something of an internet cult hero), he was cred-
ited with having provided much information on civilian deaths in Iraq
to the media, which fuelled further resentment towards the war, partic-
ularly in the Arab world (Ravi 2005, 59, 61).
The rise of the print media in post-Saddam Iraq
With the fall of Baghdad on April 9, 2003, Iraq’s media environment was
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changed forever. Nearly overnight it transformed from Saddam’s
tightly-controlled propaganda machine to one of the freest media envi-
ronments in the world (Zanger 2005, 106). By the end of the month, the
Iraqi Ministry of Information had been abolished and its 7,000 employ-
ees suddenly found themselves without regular income (Zanger 2005,
107). These former state media pundits carried with them their years of
experience communicatingŒalbeit under tight controlsŒwith the Iraqi
people. In addition, Iraq also witnessed an influx of expatriates, refugees
and newcomers, who brought with them an invaluable and divergent
knowledge base gained from living in liberal democracies where they
had no doubt witnessed firsthand the function of the Fourth Estate. The
evidence of their fervent labour and newfound freedom was soon to be
seen on the streets of Baghdad where, by the end of May 2003, approxi-
mately one hundred new publications and a few new broadcast outlets
were available, while others were launched concurrently in Basra,
Kirkuk and Mosul (Daragahi 2003, 46). Come the end of 2003, this num-
ber had grown to around two hundred Iraqi-owned news publications,
and between fifteen and seventeen Iraqi-owned television stations
(Gerth 2005; Zanger 2005, 107). 
Given Iraq’s long and complex political history, it is not at all surpris-
ing that these new media formats quickly became the forum for much of
Iraq’s political jousting and debate. Indeed, most of the newspapers
were started by political parties and were partisan organs, geared
towards their stated policies and agendas. However, the domestic poli-
tics of Iraq, with its myriad of religious and ethnic divides, do not neatly
break down into a series of mutually exclusive groups. There are, as is
now commonly known, three large ethno-religious groups in IraqŒthe
Shi†ite Arabs, the Kurds and the Sunni ArabsŒas well as a number of
smaller “racial and religious minorities . . . (including) Turkomans, Per-
sians, Assyrians, Armenians, Chaldeans, Jews, Yazidis, Sabaeans, and
others” (Batatu 1982, 13) (for details on the plight of Iraq’s minorities
today, see Isakhan 2005b). Within each of these broad categories are
more intricate differences, with each sector capable of being further bro-
ken down into religious, ethnic and political sub-categories. 
For example, it is often forgotten that the Kurds are largely Sunnis,
but that there are also many Kurdish Christians and Kurdish Shi†ites.
Beyond this, the Kurds can be further divided according to their alle-
giance to the two major Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party
(KDP, founded by the legendary Mustafa Barzani in 1945 and now led
by his son, Massoud Barzani) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
(PUK, formed in 1975 and now led by the current President of Iraq, Jalal
Talabani). However, Kurdish politics is complicated further by the pres-
ence of a number of other parties, including the Communist Party of
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Iraqi Kurdistan, the Kurdish Democratic Solutions Party, and the Islamic
Group of Iraqi Kurdistan. Similarly, the Shi†ites (who have always been
the majority in modern Iraq, but were long marginalized by the central
Sunni-led government) can be understood according to their allegiance
to the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (which had
been in staunch opposition of Saddam’s rule from the safety of Iran) and
the Islamic Da†wa Party (led by former Iraqi Prime Minister, Ibrahim Al-
Jaafari). There is also the highly influential Grand Ayatollah Sistani and
a number of other pro-Shi†ite political and religious groups who hold
significant clout. Iraq’s smaller minority groups have also been active
with the formation of the Iraqi National Movement, which represents
Sunni Arabs (who ruled Iraq since its creation in the 1920s until the fall
of Saddam, but only ever constituted approximately 20 percent of Iraq’s
diverse population) and the Turkoman Brotherhood Party. Beyond
these parties are those that explicitly support singular political or reli-
gious ideologies. These include various Islamic political groups, several
nationalistic parties, a number of Iraqi parties that claim to be liberal-
democratic, and other political parties such as the Arab Socialists, the
Iraqi Communist Party, the Royal Constitutional Movement, the
Supreme Council for the Liberation of Iraq and the Pan-Arab Move-
ment.
What is particularly interesting about these ethnic, religious and polit-
ical groups is that each of them has produced their own newspaper since
the fall of Saddam Hussein. Not surprisingly, these publications have
been joined by those who claim to be free of such allegiances, including
several liberal-democratic organs, those produced by collectives of jour-
nalists, independent publishing houses and others which promote peace
and tolerance amid the ongoing violence. In addition, Iraq has also seen
the production of several sports bulletins, arts and culture magazines, a
few industry-related bulletins, several children’s and student maga-
zines, comedic publications containing sharp political satire, and still
others which resemble the tawdry British tabloids, detailing local and
international gossip and entertainment news as well as featuring pic-
tures of scantily clad women (for comprehensive lists, see Iraqi Media,
2003; The New Iraq Press, 2003). Indeed, the demand for authentic news
in Iraq has been so strong and the publication of all manner of papers so
pervasive, that it has been increasingly difficult to keep track of many of
them. It can be assumed that there are enormous variances in quality,
life-span and readership between them, ranging from the highly sophis-
ticated and professional organs read by a wide audience across the spec-
trum of the Iraqi population, to the short-lived, hackneyed efforts of
clearly biased individuals pandering to a sympathetic few. There are,
however, several that are worthy of more detailed analysis. 
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Amongst Iraq’s burgeoning press scene are several pro-American
daily newspapers that are run by associates of Ahmad Chalabi, includ-
ing Al-Mu¥tamar (“The Congress”) (Mazzetti and Daragahi 2005), Al-
Jam§h•r (“The Masses”) and Al-Maw£il (“Mosul”) (Rugh 2004, 116-117).
In the 1990s Chalabi had formed part of the Iraqi National Congress,
which had worked unsuccessfully with the US government to over-
throw Saddam. In the lead up to the 2003 invasion, Chalabi supplied
suspect information to the Bush administration regarding Iraq’s alleged
stockpile of WMD and later served as Iraq’s interim deputy prime min-
ister. At one point, Chalabi was the favourite of the Pentagon and it was
assumed that he had popular support within Iraq and would easily
ascend the political hierarchy to lead the nation (Facts behind the smears,
2004). However, Chalabi failed to win a single seat in Iraq’s December
2005 elections, and today he is under investigation by several United
States departments and remains wanted by the Jordanian authorities on
allegations of bank fraud. 
Other Iraqi expatriates also have a vested interest in Iraq’s new media
environment. During the 1980s and early 1990s, there were few journal-
ists more adept at ascending the media hierarchy of Iraq than Sa†d al-
Bazzaz. He held a succession of senior positions, including the editorship
of A l - J u m h ¶ r i y y a, the paper that had supported the Ba†th from as far back
as 1968 and continued to extol its virtues throughout the reign of Saddam
Hussein. In addition, his career also included managing the Iraqi
National News Agency and the Ministry of Information, overseeing the
production and broadcasting of all Iraqi radio and TV (Zengerle 2002).
However, his disagreements with Saddam over quality control and his
objection to the invasion of Kuwait led al-Bazzaz to defect to the United
Kingdom in 1992. From London in 1997 al-Bazzaz began Iraq’s only inde-
pendent pan-Arab daily, A z z a m a n (“The Times”), which quickly grew to
include international editions issued from Bahrain and North Africa.
With the success of A z z a m a n, al-Bazzaz was able to expand his growing
media empire to include “a monthly current-affairs magazine, a semi-
annual culture magazine . . . and a number of booksŒranging from Ara-
bic translations of Jean-Paul Sartre to reportage on Afghanistan,”
(Zengerle 2002) all of which were highly esteemed as professional in both
their content and production. However, this was not enough for al-Baz-
zaz, as he had long dreamed of returning to his homeland and distribut-
ing his publications throughout the media-impoverished landscape of
Iraq. With the fall of Saddam in 2003, al-Bazzaz saw his opportunity and
he started to distribute from Baghdad. The years in exile and the com-
mitment to quality meant that A z z a m a n was an instant hit on the streets
of Iraq, where it was the only full-colour 24-page daily which reported
global, regional and local stories with a mildly Arab-nationalist tendency
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(Daragahi 2003, 48). It quickly became Iraq’s most widely-read newspa-
per, printing about 60,000 issues in Baghdad, and was able to support
another office in Basra (Iraq: Closure of Al-Arabiya News Channel 2003). Not
stopping here, al-BazzazŒnicknamed the Rupert Murdoch of IraqŒhas
since ventured into television, developing A l - S h a r q i y y a (“The Eastern
One”) into Iraq’s most-watched TV channel, hosting comedy and reality
TV programs (Ciezadlo 2004). 
In Iraqi Kurdistan, a well-educated and articulate man by the name of
Ahmad Shawkat, who had once been imprisoned by Saddam, returned
to Iraq before the war in the hope of finding work as a translator for the
influx of foreign journalists entering the country (Two Notable Books on
Journalists in Iraq, 2005). Luckily, Shawkat found Michael Goldfarb, a
London correspondent for National Public Radio (US), and the two
worked together in detailing the early stages of the war from the per-
spective of Kurdistan. Later, Shawkat was able to start his own non-par-
tisan newspaper, Bilattij§h (“Without Direction,” or perhaps, “Without
Bias”) which had the stated goal of fighting “for the building of a new
Iraq and a civil society and a transparent democracy in a time of free-
dom” (Shawkat as cited in Zanger 2005, 108). Sadly, the damning edito-
rials he wrote regarding the union that had formed between Islamic
fundamentalists and former Ba†thists led to his assassination, and
prompted Goldfarb to document his friend’s eventful life and tragic
death in Ahmad’s War, Ahmad’s Peace: Surviving Under Saddam, Dying in
the New Iraq (Goldfarb 2005). 
As well as expatriates and exiled Iraqis, others were keen to harness
Iraq’s new-found media freedom and the people’s thirst for unadulter-
ated news. Among them was the crew assembled by two young college
students at the American University of Beirut, Ralph Hassall (British) and
David Enders (American). On a brave whim and a shoestring budget they
made it into Iraq and set up the Baghdad Bulletin, the nation’s only non-
partisan English-language paper whose first edition appeared in June
2003 (Thomsen 2004, 124). What differentiated the Baghdad Bulletin f r o m
other Iraqi papers of the time was not only that it was published in Eng-
lish, but that it was most likely the only publication that was both read by
and featured articles submitted from both sides: members of the Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA) and the (English-reading/writing) Iraqi
population. In the first issue, Enders editorialized that “Inevitably, a civil
society will be born out of the [current] uncertainty [in post-war Iraq]. A
necessary part of such a society is a free press” (Enders as cited in Thom-
sen 2004, 125). To achieve this lofty goal, the young crew of the B a g h d a d
B u l l e t i n employed and trained as many willing Iraqis as they could find
(Enders 2003). Unfortunately, however, the paper’s slim budget quickly
vanished, and due to Iraq’s weak domestic advertising market, the B a g h -
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dad Bulletin’s publication was suspended in September 2003 after only
seven issues. Many of the staff since went on to work for some of the
world’s leading media organizations, while Enders documented his expe-
riences in his book, Baghdad Bulletin: Dispatches on the American Occupation
(Enders 2005). 
Perhaps the most telling sign of the end of Saddam’s brutal monopoly
over the nation of Iraq and its media has been the re-launch of A l - M a n § r.
In the coup of 1968 when the Ba†th Party seized control of Iraq, A l - M a n § r
was promptly shut down and its publisher, Abdul Aziz Barakat (who was
also the head of Iraq’s journalist’s union) was arrested and later executed.
Prior to this, A l - M a n § r had an exceptional reputation and was widely con-
sidered Iraq’s most professional and objective paper. In the new Iraqi
media landscape one of Barakat’s former pupils, the seventy-year-old
Taha Arif Muhammad mustered together a crew of forty journalists from
across Iraq, setting up bureaus in Hilla, Karbala, Najaf, Basra, Kirkuk and
Mosul. Due to the fact that the telecommunications infrastructure is still
poor in today’s Iraq, these journalists send their stories to Baghdad via
courier and, when printed, A l - M a n § r has a circulation of approximately
15,000 (Daragahi 2003, 50). 
In addition to the successful re-emergence of Al-Man§r has been that
of ⁄abazb¶z, an organ filled with political satire and which was last pub-
lished in Iraq in 1932. After having graduated from Baghdad’s College
of Mass Media, Ashtar Ali Yasseri worked for one of Uday’s tightly con-
trolled papers, Al-Zawra, where she honed her skills toeing the line of
the Ba†thist regime. Seeing the lighter side of post-Saddam Iraq, Yasseri
decided to revive the organ which had best satirized the British occupa-
tion of the 1920s and 30s, ⁄abazb¶z. Commenting on her illustrated
weekly which frequently takes pot-shots at the US occupation, Yasseri
stated “This is the best time for this kind of newspaper . . . It’s good to
make fun of things. It feels good to laugh” (Yasseri as cited in Daragahi
2003, 50).
Other newspapers which have emerged include Al-Mad§ (“The View”
or “The Orbit”), which is commonly considered to be Iraq’s highbrow
newspaper, publishing both investigative reports of a professional stan-
dard and cultivating Iraqi’s fondness for literature by publishing Arabic
poetry (Mazzetti and Daragahi 2005). However, the ownership of Al-
Mad§ is unclear, with competing claims that it is another of Chalabi’s
US-backed papers (Facts behind the smears, 2004) versus those that claim
it is the mouthpiece of Muqtada al-Sadr, the son of the Shi†ite leader,
Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, who was executed by Sad-
dam’s agents in 1999 (Rosen 2004). There is also Al-S§†a (“The Hour”), a
semi-weekly published by Uday Hussein’s former personal assistant,
Adeeb Shabaan, who was imprisoned during the final days of Saddam’s
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regime for his disagreements with Uday (Daragahi 2003, 49). Finally, as
has already been mentioned, Iraq’s media sector extends out from these
examples to include those papers which speak for all manner of reli-
gious, ethnic and political persuasions, covering the diverse and
nuanced interests of this complex nation. 
As is to be expected, there are many problems that go along with such
a divergent, ad hoc and highly volatile media landscape. First and fore-
most, the media in Iraq is operating outside of an appropriate legal
framework. Despite some early attempts to establish the parameters of a
free and independent press in post-Saddam Iraq, such as a conference
attended by various figures from Iraq’s media sector in Athens in 2003
(Daragahi 2003, 50), these have proven relatively unsuccessful. The issue
of the legal framework for Iraq’s emerging media sector aside, employ-
ment as a journalist is still an extremely dangerous profession in Iraq as
US occupation, foreign insurgents and sectarian strife continue to ravage
the country. Recently, the Iraqi Journalists Association (IJA) and the
Arab Press Freedom Watch (APFW) have called on the newly-appointed
government in Baghdad to take greater security measures for the pro-
tection of journalists. As part of its request, the IJA cited that 112 Iraqi
journalists and media workers had been killed since March 2003 (Iraq:
Local journalists call for increased protection, 2006), let alone the countless
others who have been harassed, wounded, imprisoned and tortured.
Beyond the impact that these dangers continue to have on the day-
to-day lives of the citizens of Iraq and their media sector are the influences
of the many foreign powersŒparticularly Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United
States and Great Britain. Each of these has their own vested interests in the
situation and evolving politics of Iraq, largely due to its vast reserves of
oil but also because of its geographical location and the myriad of reli-
gious and ethnic sects that are vying for power. This has meant that, in
addition to the above, some of Iraq’s recent media developments have
openly served as a mouthpiece for these foreign powers. The religio-polit-
ical papers, Al-†Ad§la (“The Justice”) and N a h r a y n (“Two Rivers”) are a
case-in-point as they are Shi†ite papers openly published and distributed
by the pro-Iranian Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
(Daragahi 2003, 49; Rugh 2004, 117). More discreetly, the Saudi Arabian
governmentŒwhich has invested heavily in various pan-Arab organs
across the regionŒare believed to be funding Sa†d al-Bazzaz’s A z z a m a n
franchise, including Iraq’s highest rating TV channel, Al-Sharqiyya (I r a q i
Independent Media Mogul Accused of Running Saudi-funded covert Propa -
ganda Operation, 2005).
However, the efforts of the Iranians and the Saudis pale in compari-
son to those of the United States. In fact, shortly after the fall of Baghdad
in 2003, the Bush administration poured millions into the development
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of the Iraqi media (Gerth 2005). While this money has certainly helped
in developing papers that range from explicitly pro-US to non-partisan
(such as Al-Mu¥tamar and Bilattij§h respectively), it has also been used to
shut down those papers which directly challenged the strategic interests
of the CPA. Under the leadership of Lewis Paul Bremmer III, the CPA,
on behalf of the United States government, issued “Order Number 14:
Prohibited Media Activity,” which deemed any publication that “incites
violence . . . incites civil disorder . . . incites violence against Coalition
Forces or CPA personnel . . . advocates alterations to Iraq’s borders” or
“advocates the return of the Iraqi Ba†th Party” as illegal (Bremmer 2003,
1-2). The penalties for breaking such prohibitions were severe, including
detainment, arrest and prosecution, with a sentence of up to one year in
prison, while in “emergencies” the Coalition Forces were permitted to
“take direct action to prevent or defeat the threat” (Bremmer 2003, 2).
Indeed, the US forces were not reluctant to take such “direct action.” In
2003, Al-Mustaqilla (“The Independent”) was shut down by the CPA and
the managing editor, Dhari al-Duleimi, was arrested after publishing an
article that claimed the killing of those who cooperate with the CPA was
a religious duty (Brahimi 2003). This was followed in 2004 by the closure
of Al-⁄awza (the name of a particular Shi†ite seminary), another news-
paper accused of being the mouthpiece of Muqtada al-Sadr and termi-
nated for the publication of articles such as “America Hates Islam and
Muslims” (Al-Sheikh 2004; Gettleman 2004; Rosen 2004). The Baghdad
office of the popular pan-Arab TV station Al-†Arabiyya (“The Arab”) was
also closed down and its journalists banned from working in Iraq for an
indefinite period following the screening of a tape that saw Saddam
urge Iraqis to resist the US occupation (Iraq: Closure of Al-†Arabiyya News
Channel, 2003).
Well before the CPA seized control of Iraq, the US and UK had inau-
gurated a new Iraqi satellite TV station named Na¡wa al-⁄urriyya
(“Towards Freedom”) (Rutherford 2004, 60). Launched by personal mes-
sages from both US President George W. Bush and British Prime Minis-
ter Tony Blair, the station was beamed into Iraq from a purpose-built
Commando Solo aeroplane (‘Towards Freedom TV’: A Channel Targeting
the Iraqis, launched by Messages from Blair and Bush, 2003). On the ground,
the United States spent much money and effort to resurrect both Sad-
dam’s Ministry of Information and his International News Agency
(INA), which were all but destroyed by both the bombing of Baghdad
and the ensuing looting that ravaged many public institutions (Coalition
Forces Bombard Iraqi State TV, 2003). The Ministry of Information was
renamed the Iraqi Media Network (IMN) by the CPA (Rugh 2004, 116),
and it now consists of Al-†Ir§qiyya (“The Iraqi”), a national TV station
modelled on the BBC, both the Al-‹ab§¡ (“The Morning”) and Al-S¶mir
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(“The Sumerian”Œpublished in Kuwait for distribution in Iraq) news-
papers and at least one radio station. Around 90 percent of IMN’s staff
are former Ministry of Information employees (McCaul 2003) who seem
to be revelling in the opportunity to report the news without the men-
acing auspices of Saddam and his son, Uday. However, despite this,
there are a number of concerns about the IMN and its clear prejudice
towards the US occupation (Gourevitch 2003), with the independent
Iraqi Media Assessment Report (IMAR) recommending that, due to its
ties to the CPA, the IMN should be “dismantled and the constituent
parts all located within independent institutions” (McCaul 2003). The
INA on the other hand, was resurrected and re-named the National Iraqi
News Agency (NINA) by Dr Farid Ayar, who had been an INA journal-
ist before leaving Iraq in the 1990s. Today, Ayar is a member of the Iraqi
Independent Electoral Commission, and despite claims that NINA
“does not have any links with any official or unofficial party, it will be
self-financing to ensure its independence and it does not rely on any for-
eign financing sources” (NINA: A New Iraqi News Agency, 2005), it was
originally established by the US-funded International Research and
Exchange Board (IREX). 
Other United States involvement in Iraq’s fledgling media environ-
ment has been more sinister and clandestine. It has long been known
that the United States conducted its extensive Psychological Operations
(“PsyOps”) campaign throughout the 1990s under the Clinton adminis-
tration (Myers 1999; Sussman 2005) and that it was extended well in
advance of the Coalition invasion of 2003 (Clark and Christie 2005;
Rutherford 2004, 55-60; Taylor 2003). However, it has only recently come
to light that this same operation has since been responsible for covertly
planting pro-US news stories in the Iraqi press. In mid-2004, a company
by the name of the Lincoln Group formed a partnership with the Ren-
don Group (which had earlier been hired by Washington to help counter
Taliban propaganda in the Afghanistan war) (Gerth 2005). Together they
were awarded a $100 million dollar contract by the Pentagon to continue
“strategic communications” in Iraq (Mazzetti and Daragahi 2005; U.S.
war propaganda carries on, 2006). Part of this operation entailed covertly
running more than 1,000 news articles in twelve to fifteen of Iraq’s news-
papers at a cost of between $40 and $2,000 per item (Gerth 2005). These
stories were mainly written by US soldiers who were part of the “Infor-
mation Operations” program, and then translated into Arabic by the
Lincoln Group’s Iraqi staff who later posed as wealthy freelancers, offer-
ing the shoestring Iraqi press money in exchange for publication
(Mazzetti and Daragahi 2005; U.S. war propaganda carries on, 2006). It was
never disclosed to the papers that these articlesŒwhich were typically
written from an Iraqi perspective and purposefully designed to cater to
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specific ethnic or religious groups (such as Shi†ites or Kurds) and to
address key issues (including terrorism or democracy) Œwere actually
the cleverly-disguised propaganda of the occupying force. Although
papers such as the pro-American Al-Mu¥tamar did not seem too con-
cerned about their publication of such articles, others, such as the editor
of the well-respected Al-Mad§, understandably expressed his outrage
(Mazzetti and Daragahi 2005), while an editorial in Azzaman deemed
such actions a blatant attempt “to humiliate the independent national
press” of Iraq (Gerth 2005).
The irony here barely needs to be stated. The Bush administration has
been adamant that the proliferation of democracy around the globe, and
particularly across the Middle East, is central to its broader geo-political
agenda (see the first State of the Union Address of Bush’s second term
in 2005). Yet, at the same time, they are undermining one of the hall-
marks of Iraq’s emergent democracyŒits free and independent
pressŒboth by developing state media services such as the IMN which
openly serve US purposes, and by undermining via more clandestine
methods the independence of those media organs who do not. 
Unfortunately, the interference in Iraq’s media sector is not limited to
those governments which exist outside its borders. Despite the fact that
the Iraqi ConstitutionŒfinalized by the Iraqi National Assembly in
August 2005 and ratified by the people of Iraq in October of that same
yearŒguarantees “Freedom of press, printing, advertisement, media
and publication” (The Iraqi Constitution, 2005), the Iraqi media industry
has continued to suffer since the establishment of the Iraqi Government.
This has included prison sentences of one and a half years for criticizing
senior figures such as the Kurdish Governor, Massoud Barzani (APFW
Alert: APFW Condemns the Verdict Against Kamal Sayed Qader, 2006), the
arrest and detention of other Iraqi journalists (APFW Calls for the Release
of Iraqi Journalist, 2006), as well as bashings and harassment by Iraqi
police (APFW Denounces the Aggression on Al Hurra Reported by Iraqi
Police, 2006). These situations have led some papers, such as Al-Shah•d al-
Mustaqill (“The Independent Martyr”) to a self-imposed temporary ces-
sation in publication (Iraq: Al Shahid al Mustaqel Stops publishing in
Response to Governmental Practices, 2006), while others have been forced
to close, including the Baghdad office of Al-Jazeera for one month for
allegedly inciting violence and hatred amongst the Iraqi people (IFJ
Accuses Iraq of “Unacceptable and Illogical Censorship” Over Ban on Al-
Jazeera, 2004; Iraq Shuts Al-Jazeera Baghdad Office for a Month, 2004). More
recently, the Iraqi Parliament urged Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to
close down Sa†d al-Bazzaz’s media empireŒincluding both the Azzaman
newspaper and the Al-Sharqiyya television stationŒunder allegations
that they were too critical of a recent draft law that proposed turning
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Iraq into a federal state (Parliament asks government to close Azzaman,
2006). 
In addition to these problems are reports that the quality and profes-
sionalism of the Iraqi press is highly dubious. As Zanger has pointed
out, “nearly all [Iraqi] papers trade in street rumour, conspiracy theories,
and endless editorial comment, often based not on fact but bias, miscon-
ceptions and wild innuendo” (2005, 107). These papers have also been
criticized for the quality of their written Arabic, which is said to be
below professional standards, while the articles themselves often fail to
meet the basic journalistic criteria of objectivity and accuracy (Whitaker
2003). There are also parallels being drawn to examples such as Algeria
of the 1980s and Yemen of the 1990s, where political changes led to an
eruption of political parties and a thriving media sector. Unfortunately,
in both of these cases, the progress was short-lived and within a few
years the number, diversity and critical approach of these papers dwin-
dled considerably (Whitaker 2003). The same is expected of Iraq, partic-
ularly if the domestic economyŒwhich was already significantly eroded
due to twelve years of sanctions prior to the warŒdoes not escalate to
levels where considerable advertising revenue can be generated (Dara-
gahi 2003, 50). 
However, despite all of this, there is reason to be optimistic. Thirty-
five years of Ba†thist rule and its tight restrictions on the media has left
in its wake an Iraqi population that has developed an “abysmal distrust
of official news” (Bengio 2004, 109) and is skilled in navigating carefully-
crafted propaganda (Braude 2003, 141-142). This can be seen in the fact
that most Iraqis have exercised their right to eschew the US-backed
media in favour of the local, independent press. As Mirzoeff notes, the
people of Iraq have “steadfastly refused to watch Iraqi Media Network,
the US official television station, seeing it as simply more propaganda”
(2005, 76). Beyond this, even former employees of the Lincoln Group
have noted that the broader ‘PsyOps’ program, despite its enormous
cost, was largely ineffective due to the fact that Iraqis knew the content
was American (Gerth 2005; U.S. war propaganda carries on, 2006). Even the
uncovering of the Lincoln Group’s association with the Pentagon and
their collective strategy of planting pro-US news items in the indepen-
dent Iraqi press was “met mostly with shrugs in Baghdad, where read-
ers tend to be sceptical about the media” (Gerth 2005).
Conclusion 
Iraq’s relationship with the written word can be seen to go back as far as
writing itself. It began when the complex societies of the Bronze Age
prompted the development of a written language known as cuneiform.
At first this language was used to document the mechanisms of trade
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and commerce, but it evolved to include a rich literary catalogue and to
detail an egalitarian and collective political structure. Later, following
the introduction of Islam, cities such as Baghdad became known for their
burgeoning public sphere constituted by a myriad of talented poets,
writers and scholars who frequented the bourgeois salons that dotted
the capital. This lively civic culture was later fostered by the Ottomans
and, at least as far back as 1869, Iraq witnessed the mass communication
opportunities afforded by the modern printing press. This new technol-
ogy, coupled with the liberties granted by the Young Turks, ushered in
a new era of unprecedented press freedom in the region, which served
to augment Iraq’s culture of public debate and criticism. 
With the advent of modern Iraq under the auspices of the British fol-
lowing the end of the First World War came a thriving debate over the
future of this fledgling nation. Here, Iraq’s many newspapers were cen-
tral to propagating this discussion, providing a voice to the myriad of
political, religious and ethnic factions competing for influence under the
newly-installed monarchy. As Iraq emerged as an independent nation in
1930, it unfortunately witnessed its own political climate descend into a
succession of coups d’état that led to a highly censored and controlled
media sector. Following the Second World War and through much of the
1950s, however, Iraq witnessed a return to a vigorous public sphere con-
stituted by a number of organs that were unprecedented in their profes-
sionalism and popularity. Unfortunately, this era was short-lived and
another series of coups d’état in the 1960s eventually led to the ascension
of the Ba†th Party in 1968 and the subsequent “self-elected” presidency
of Saddam Hussein beginning in 1979, where Iraq’s political culture and
free press deteriorated substantially. Saddam’s brutal grip over what he
termed the ‘information corps’ meant that any lingering notions of press
freedom and objectivity held by idealistic journalists was soon quashed. 
Despite the fact that the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the US-led “Coalition
of the Willing” was an erroneous, egregious and illegitimate act, it did
see the toppling and later execution of one of the twentieth century’s
most brutal tyrants, Saddam Hussein. This afforded an unrivalled
upsurge in media freedoms across the nation, resulting in a shift from
five tightly controlled propaganda organs to around 200 Iraqi-owned
news publications by the end of that year. Once again, Iraq’s complex
matrix of political, religious and ethnic allegiances unfolded across the
pages of the nations press. Many of these newly-formed papers were
understandably biased towards particular segments of Iraq’s popula-
tion, following certain agendas and proliferating particular ideologies.
Others maintained a high level of objectivity and journalistic integrity,
revelling in their newfound freedom to practice their profession and
their chance to connect with a population thirsty for authentic news.
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More recently, reports have surfaced regarding the extensive interfer-
ence that foreign entities have caused upon Iraq’s developing media sec-
tor. Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and even
the newly-established Iraqi government all stand accused of having
used both overt and clandestine methods to suppress the freedom of the
Iraqi press.
However, there is still reason to be optimistic about the role that Iraq’s
thriving media environment can play as the Fourth Estate in the resur-
rection of Iraq’s public sphere. Firstly, Saddam’s tight control over the
media sector left a population that is savvy to the intricacies of propa-
ganda and capable of navigating through suspicious content. This media
literacy, coupled with the many independent Iraqi papers publishing
freely across the nation, are not only crucial in re-establishing a partici-
patory and engaged public sphere, but can also help to abate the many
conflicts across Iraq and thereby aid the shift towards a free, egalitarian
and democratic nation. Secondly, Iraq’s media can be seen to have
played a central role in promoting the succession of Iraqi elections and
referendums held throughout 2005 (for more details on the Iraqi elec-
tions of 2005, see Isakhan 2005a, 2006a). This is evidenced by the millions
of Iraqi citizens who, despite threats of further violence, lined the streets
of the nation for their chance to take part in the first truly democratic
elections held in the nation for many decades. Specifically, the many
partisan and non-partisan organs that littered Iraq in the lead up to these
elections fulfilled their duty of informing the populace as to the central
issues facing the nation and the stances taken by the many political par-
ties emerging across Iraq. This resurgence of the Iraqi citizenship play-
ing an active role in their own governance, as well as their engagement
with a free press, is crucial to the development of an informed and active
public sphere. 
Much, therefore, rests on the shoulders of Iraq’s fledgling media sec-
tor. The ability of Iraq’s press to accurately report both on the events and
struggles of modern Iraq and to serve as the forum of varied delibera-
tion, debate and discourse is critical to the survival of its nascent public
sphere. In turn, this public sphere is central to the mobilization of an
informed and politically active Iraqi population. A free and independent
Iraqi press is not only crucial in re-establishing a participatory and
engaged public sphere, but it can also help to abate the many conflicts
across Iraq and thereby aid the shift towards a free, egalitarian and
democratic future. 
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